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THROUGHOUT  1983 and 1984, the United  States  experienced  an excep- 
tionally strong recovery of capital formation from the depths of the 1980- 
82 recession.  Between  the fourth quarter of 1982, the recession  trough, 
and the fourth quarter of  1984, total business  fixed investment,  even 
after adjustment for inflation, increased by 33 percent-more  than double 
the average  15 percent  gain at a comparable  stage  in previous  post- 
World War II economic  recoveries.  Investment  in producers'  durable 
equipment was up a remarkable 42 percent. 
There has been no shortage of explanations for the surge in investment 
spending.  Most  prominently  mentioned  is the  1981-82 tax act,  which 
sharply reduced the tax rate on income from new investments. ' Other 
explanations include the lower rate of inflation, which has improved the 
outlook  for sustained  economic  growth in the  United  States,  and the 
acceleration  of  technological  change,  reflected  in the replacement  of 
capital stock  made obsolete  by energy price changes  during the  1970s 
and in the increasing use  of computers  in production.  A few  analysts 
even link the rise in the value of the dollar to increased investment. Their 
I am indebted to Eileen Mauskopf of the Federal Reserve Board staff and to the authors 
of several articles cited in the text for providing data. In addition, Charles R. Hulten of the 
Urban Institute was helpful in computing the impact of the 1981-82 tax reductions by asset 
category.  Mike Thomas provided research assistance,  and Kathleen Elliott Yinug typed 
the manuscript. 
1. The  Economic  Recovery  Tax  Act  of  1981 called  for  a phased  liberalization  of 
business taxation stretching over several years. Some of these provisions never took effect 
because of modifications to the law made in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility  Act 
of  1982. These  changes  are  explained  in greater  detail  in  a  subsequent  section.  For 
simplicity I use "the 1981-82 tax act" to refer to the net effect of those two acts. 
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argument, which departs from the conventional  view  that a rise in the 
exchange  rate increases  the cost  of domestic  production  and reduces 
investment incentives,  is that a higher exchange  rate presses  American 
firms to invest to maintain a competitive  position in world markets. 
This paper investigates  the investment expansion in recent years with 
an emphasis on the effect of tax changes. The issue is important, because 
the United States is engaged in another debate over tax reform, and the 
impact on capital formation is again emerging as a major criterion on 
which all tax proposals will be judged. 
My analysis considers  the composition  as well as the level of invest- 
ment spending. The  1981-82 tax act had widely different effects  on tax 
rates for different types of capital assets.  While the tax rates on income 
from investments in structures all declined substantially, rates for income 
from  some  types  of  equipment,  such  as trucks  and office  equipment 
(computers), actually increased. The range of tax rate changes offers an 
opportunity to explore  further the link between  taxes  and investment 
decisions  by examining  the changes  in the composition  of investment 
spending  since  1981 and relating these  changes  to changes  in relative 
rates of taxation. 
General Trends in Investment 
A brief overview of the investment boom provides a useful background 
for the more detailed analysis that follows.  A comparison of the current 
economic  recovery  with past postwar economic  expansion  is provided 
in table  1. In the first three columns  of the table each  component  of 
investment is shown in index form with its value in 1982:4 (the recession 
trough) equal  to  100. The growth of each  component  from  1982:4 to 
1984:4 is compared with the average growth during the first two years of 
recovery from previous postwar recessions. 
The spectacular recent gain in investment demand is concentrated in 
aggregate  producers'  durable  equipment  (PDE),  where,  after  eight 
quarters, investment  spending was 42 percent above its recession  low, 
compared with an average rise of 20 percent in previous  cycles.  Since 
the standard deviation of the 20 percent average gain of earlier expansions 
is only 2.4 percent,  it is clear that recent investment  spending has been 
highly unusual. Particularly dramatic has been the growth of investment Barr-i-y  P. Boswvorth  3 
Table 1.  Indexes of Cyclical Grawth in Business Investment, Previous Cycle Average 
and 1982-84 
Index of  1972 dollars 
Recession  trolugh  eqluals 
I OOa  Previous  peak  eqluals  I  Oob 
Folur th  Eighth  Foiur th  Eighth 
qluar-ter  qluarter  quarter  quarter 
Trouigh  aifter  aftter  Tr-olugh  after  after 
Categoty  quarter  trolugh  tr'olughl  quarter  trough  troulg 
Gross national product 
Previous  cycle  average  100  107  112  98  105  110 
1982-84  100  106  112  99  106  112 
Nonresidential  structures 
Previous  cycle  average  100  106  108  95  100  103 
1982-84  100  99  115  102  101  117 
Producers' durable equipment 
Previous cycle  average  100  111  120  90  100  107 
1982-84  100  121  142  91  110  128 
Office equipment 
Previous cycle  average  100  111  126  95  104  115 
1982-84  100  124  159  159  197  252 
Business  automobiles 
Previous  cycle  average  100  145  140  85  120  110 
1982-84  100  145  173  104  150  179 
Other equipment 
Previous cycle  average  100  108  119  90  96  106 
1982-84  100  117  131  77  90  101 
Domestic  production of 
other equipment 
1982-84  100  112  120  70  79  85 
Sources:  National  income  and product accounts  and author's calculations  as described  in the text. 
a.  Index  =  100 in 1982:4, the trough quarter, for current cycle. 
b.  Index  =  100 in  1979:3-1979:4 for current cycle. 
spending for  two  types  of  assets:  office  equipment  (computers)  and 
business purchases of automobiles,  with increases of 59 and 73 percent, 
respectively.  Even  so,  spending for all other types  of equipment  has 
increased an average of 31 percent since the recession  trough. The first- 
year gain in nonresidential structures investment  was less than normal, 
but a strong expansion in 1984 carried the level of spending significantly 
above the prior cycle average-15  percent compared with 8 percent. 
Interestingly,  the  overall  recovery  as  measured  by  the  growth  of 
GNP, a primary determinant of capital requirements, has been no better 
than average. After eight quarters GNP has increased by  12 percent- 4  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1  :1985 
exactly the average of prior expansions.  If GNP growth is not responsible 
for today's investment boom, what is? 
The argument has been made that current investment  spending has 
been growing rapidly only because  it sank so low in the long  1980-82 
recession,  when high financing costs plus declines in total output exerted 
an unusual degree of restraint on investment  spending.  That argument 
is examined in the last three columns of table 1, where spending at the 
prior business-cycle  peak (the average of the third and -fourth  quarters 
of  1979 for the current cycle)  is set equal to  100. For the aggregate of 
PDE,  spending at the trough of the recent recession  was only 9 percent 
below  its previous peak, compared with a historical average decline of 
10percent.2The  level of aggregate spending on structures in the recession 
was typical of previous  cycles.  On this basis,  the investment  recovery 
since  1982 is,  if anything,  even  more unusual than it appears at first 
glance. 
A  much  more  diverse  pattern  of  behavior  is  evident  among  the 
components  of  PDE.  Spending  on office  equipment,  which  has  been 
expanding at a phenomenal  pace  since  1979, hardly slowed  during the 
recession.  It was  152 percent above its 1979 level at the end of 1984. In 
fact,  office equipment accounted  for 27 percent of total PDE in 1984:4 
and for over two-thirds of the increase since  1979. Likewise,  the growth 
in  business  spending  on  automobiles  showed  no  decline  during the 
recession  and rose 79 percent  between  1979 and 1984. Other types  of 
equipment spending, however,  declined very sharply (23 percent) during 
the recession  and exceeded  the 1979 level  only in the fourth quarter of 
1984. 
Overall, office equipment and automobiles  account for 93 percent of 
the growth  in equipment  spending  since  1979-a  pattern that causes 
problems for an explanation of the growth in investment  spending that 
emphasizes  the  1981-82 tax reduction.  Not  only did the tax act make 
almost  no  change  in  the  tax  treatment  of  automobiles,  it  actually 
increased the tax rate on computers. 
Another important aspect of the current investment boom is revealed 
in an examination of the growth in the capital stock.  If the United States 
2.  Surprisingly, the decline  in GNP is also not particularly severe  compared with the 
past. Of course,  the recession  was more severe than earlier downturns if it is measured in 
terms of the deviation from potential output, which continued to grow over the three years 
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had had no recession  after 1979 and if output had expanded  steadily at 
the  average  growth  rate  of  the  1979-84  period,  the  maintenance  of 
investment  rates at the level  prevailing in  1979 would  have  yielded  a 
specific capital stock, K. Instead, actual investment was low for several 
years  and  then  rose  sharply.  Has  the  recent  exceptional  growth  in 
investment  been sufficient to overcome  earlier losses  and to leave  the 
United States with a capital stock  as large as,  or larger than, it would 
have had along a steady growth path? A computation using the average 
growth of output between  1979:4 and 1984:4 and a net investment  share 
of output equal to that of 1979 shows that the loss of capital exceeded  5 
percent  cf  the stock  by the end of  1984. In other words,  the capital- 
output ratio at the end of 1984 was roughly 5 percent lower than it would 
have been if the United States had had no recession  and no tax cut. In 
fact, the shortfall is larger than the total amount of net investment  made 
in  1984. Thus  the  United  States  will  require  several  more  years  of 
exceptional  investment  simply to recover its earlier capital losses. 
There is no mystery why the American capital-goods industries seem 
so  unappreciative  of the  recovery  in capital  spending.  A  measure  of 
domestically produced capital goods can be constructed by adding export 
demand to, and subtracting imports from, the measures of U.S.  spending 
on capital goods,  as  shown  in table  1. The index  for nonautomotive, 
nonoffice equipment, shown at the bottom of the table, fell to 70 percent 
of the 1979 peak at the end of 1982 and had risen only to 85 percent by 
the end of  1984. Thus,  for the American  capital-goods  producers  the 
1980-82 recession  was very severe; the recovery,  very incomplete.  Not 
only is American investment  being financed by well-publicized  foreign 
borrowing; much of it is being built overseas. 
The extent of the capital-goods boom is also in question because some 
observers dispute the classification  of certain products as investment in 
the  national  income  accounts.  For  example,  the  category  of  office 
equipment includes personal home computers, a product that could well 
be classified as a consumer good  .3 Similarly, the rapid growth of business 
purchases  of  automobiles  reflects  a  movement  by  consumers  from 
private ownership to leasing of automobiles,  where the latter is classified 
as a business  activity.  Because  the national income  accounts  measure 
3.  Office equipment does  not include  industrial computers  (for example,  numerical 
control equipment), which are allocated to other categories. 6  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1985 
investment as a summation of sales (minus exports and plus imports) for 
specific classes  of products,  the data frequently fail to provide a basis 
for allocating individual products between consumption and investment 
applications. 
An alternative approach is to use surveys that ask business firms how 
much they spend on capital goods.  The business  plant and equipment 
survey  undertaken by the Department  of Commerce  shows  a rise (14 
percent) in total investment  above its 1979 peak that is less  spectacular 
than the national iicome  account measure (33 percent), but that increase 
is still more than twice the 6 percent average growth during the first two 
years of earlier postwar  expansions.  Furthermore,  the survey  reports 
that nearly all of the above-average growth in investment is concentrated 
in  manufacturing.  Investment  in  a  wide  range  of  nonmanufacturing 
industries is normal or below normal for comparable stages of economic 
expansion. 
An Aggregate View 
Aggregate investment  equations from the large econometric  models 
provide one way to evaluate  the impact of the  1981-82 tax legislation. 
Most of these  statistical equations are based on the neoclassical  model 
in which  the desired  capital stock  is a function  of the price of capitai 
services (rental price) and anticipated future output. The model assumes 
that tax rate reductions will increase investment  by lowering the rental 
price of capital, thereby increasing the desired stock.  Because  most of 
the available empirical models assume a unitary elasticity of the demand 
for capital with respect to its rental price, it would seem to be a relatively 
straightforward matter to evaluate  the effect  of the tax cuts simply by 
computing the change in prices implied by the tax change and checking 
the predictions of the equations against actual investments  since  1981. 
In practice,  however,  things are not so simple.  For one thing, other 
determinants of investment demand are changing at the same time as the 
tax rate. For another, the existing  empirical models differ significantly 
both in the treatment of these determinants and in the measurement of 
the magnitude of the tax change. 
Nearly all of the investment equations used in the major econometric 
models  underestimated  the size of the current investment  boom,  even 
on an ex post basis in which actual values are used for the determinants Barry P. Bosworth  7 
of spending.4 The investment  equation for PDE in the Federal Reserve 
Board (FRB) model, for example,  underpredicted business  investment 
in equipment between  1978 and 1981 by amounts ranging from 5 to  10 
percent a year. The forecast  error declined  in 1982, when investment 
spending fell far more sharply than the model anticipated, but during the 
period of cyclical  expansion,  1983-84, the equation captured only two- 
thirds of the rise in equipment investment.  By the end of 1984, investment 
in PDE was about 10 percent higher than anticipated. 
The neoclassical  investment  models'  difficulty in accounting for the 
rise  in recent  investment  snending  is  understandable  in light  of  the 
widespread  uncertainty  over  what  happened  during the  1980s to  the 
rental price of capital. The cost  of using a unit of capital for a specific 
time period consists  of three components:  the cost  of acquiring it, the 
economic  cost of using it for the time period (the real cost of funds plus 
depreciation), and taxes.5 




where  c  =  rental price of capital 
Pk  =  purchase price of capital 
Pq  price of output 
r =  after-tax real cost of funds (discount rate) 
8  =  economic  depreciation 
p =  corporate profits tax rate 
z  =  present discounted  value of depreciation deductions 
k =  investment tax credit. 
Table 2 shows  changes  in each of these  components  over the  1980-84 
period.  The  changes  are  measured  in two  different  ways,  and each 
measure is used within investment equations that are otherwise identical 
in their specifications. 
4.  The investment equations used in the models of Data Resources,  Inc.,  the Federal 
Reserve Board, the University of Michigan, and Wharton Econometrics all underestimated 
investment. 
5.  Interest rates play two roles: the rieal after-tax cost of funds (opportunity cost),  r, is 
an element of economic  cost.  In addition, changes  in the nominal cost of funds, r +  'Tr, 
where  Tr  is the inflation rate, change the present value of depreciation allowances  in the 
tax term. In the calculations that follow, the effect of changes in the nominal rate is assigned 
to the economic  cost component,  and the tax term is evaluated under a constant interest 
rate assumption. 8  Br-ookinigs Paipers  oni Economic  Activity,  1:1985 
Table 2.  Percentage Deviation of the Rental Price of Capital and Its Components from 
1980 Values 
Acquisition  Cost of 
Yeart  pi-icea  Ta  .b  fiundsc  Total 
Federal  Resert'e Board Model 
1980  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
1981  -3.2  -5.9  6.5  -3.1 
1982  -  6.6  -  5.5  16.2  2.5 
1983  -  9.4  -  5.3  13.5  -2.6 
1984  -  11.1  -  5.2  19.8  1.0 
Corcoran-Saliling-Akhltar Model 
(New  Yorhk  Fedetral Reserve  Batik) 
1980  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
1981  -  3.2  -  5.9  5.5  -  5.2 
1982  -  6.6  - 5.5  9.5  -  2.7 
1983  -  9.4  -  5.3  -  1.8  -  16.2 
1984  -11.1  -5.2  3.4  -13.9 
Source:  Computed  by  author as  described  in text  on  the  basis  of  data obtained  from the  staff of the  Board of 
Governors  of the Federal Reserve  System  and the New  York Federal Reserve  Bank. 
a.  Based  on the ratio of the price deflators for prodtucers' durable equipment  and for domestic  business  output. 
b.  Percentage  change in the tax component  between  1980 and  1982. 
c.  Includes changes  in the real cost  of funds and the effect  of changes  in the nominal discount  rate in altering the 
present value of depreciation  allowances. 
The  1981-82 tax changes affected the rental price of capital in 
contradictory  ways.6  The 1981  act sharply  reduced  the time period  over 
which assets could be depreciated, and increased the investment tax 
credit for certain  types of equipment.  The 1982  act, on the other hand, 
cut off much  of this liberalization  of depreciation  accounting.  It required 
that half of the investment  tax credit be deducted  from the asset price 
before  depreciation  allowances  could  be computed,  and  denied  firms  the 
use of the accelerated depreciation  formulas common in 1980.7  The 
combined  result  of the 1981  and 1982  acts was estimated,  within  the FRB 
model,  to have reduced  the rental  price  for  the average  unit  of equipment 
by about  5 percent. 
6.  There is confusion  in the literature over whether the term "cost  of capital" refers 
to r or c. To avoid this confusion,  I will refer to c as the rental price of capital and to r as 
the cost of funds. 
7.  Before  1981, firms could use 200 percent of declining balance, with a switch to sum- 
of-the-years digits for equipment and certain types of structures. The 1982 law restricted 
accelerated  depreciation  to 150 percent of declining balance while continuing to allow a 
switch  to  sum-of-the-years  digits.  Structures  investment  received  more favorable  tax 
treatment, being allowed  175 percent of declining balance, compared with 150 percent in 
1980, with a switch to straight-line. Barrx'  P. Bosworth  9 
At the same time, the real acquisition price of capital appears to have 
fallen substantially after 1980. The pi-ice deflator for PDE rose at less 
than half the general rate of  inflation throughout  the first half of the 
1980s. Relative to the average price of nonfarm business output, equip- 
ment prices fell  11 percent between  1980 and  1984. Thus,  at least for 
equipment, the decline in the relative price was a more important stimulus 
to investment than the tax act. The combined  result of lower tax rates 
and  prices  would  appear  to  have  provided  a  powerful  stimulus  to 
investment in both equipment and structures. 
The problem is that there is a great deal of uncertainty about what 
happened  to  the  real cost  of  funds-an  unobserved  variable-in  the 
1980s. The rise in the nominal rate of return on fiiianciai assets,  together 
with the decline in inflation, implies that the opportunity cost of invest- 
ment in real assets increased. That is the conclusion  reached in the FRB 
model. In fact, the FRB measure of the cost of funds rises sufficiently to 
offset  fully the decline  in capital-goods  prices  and taxes-leaving  the 
overall rental price of capital slightly higher in 1984 than in 1980. 
An alternative approach is taken in a r_cent set of papers by Patrick 
J. Corcoran and Leonard G. Sahling, and Sahling and M. A.  Akhtar, 
reporting on  research  carried out  at the  New  York  Federal  Reserve 
Bank.8 They  use  a conceptual  framework  similar to that of the  FRB 
model, but differ in how they adjust the cost of debt finance for inflation 
expectations  and in how  they  combine  the  costs  of  debt  and equity 
finance into a single overall measure.  According  to their estimate,  the 
cost of funds, shown in table 2, increased only slightly during the 1980- 
84 period, so that the fall in relative prices and taxes  translates into a 
large reduction in the rental price of capital. 
Sahling and Akhtar inserted  their newly  developed  measure  of the 
cost of funds into the FRB model while leaving other elements  of the 
specification  unchanged.  Although  their  version  failed  to  track  the 
decline of investment  in  1980-82,  it did capture the full extent  of the 
1983-84 recovery: their error in predicting investment grew to $11 billion 
during the recession  but remained constant  between  1982 and 1984 as 
8.  Patrick J. Corcoran and Leonard G. Sahling,  "The Cost of Capital: How  High Is 
It?" Quartrterly  Review of the Fedetral Reserve Bank of NewX  York, vol. 7 (Summer 1982), 
pp. 23-3 1; Leonard G. Sahling and M. A. Akhtar, "What Is Behind the Capital Spending 
Boom?" Qararter  ly Review of the Fede ral  Reserve Bank of Newt,  York,  vol. 9 (Winter 1984- 
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investment picked up. A comparison of the forecast errors beginning in 
1980 is shown below,  in billions of 1972 dollars. 
Forecast  error 
Actual PDE  (Actual minus predicted) 
Year  investment  FRB model  Sahling-Akhtar 
1980  117.0  5.9  6.5 
1981  121.8  12.2  12.5 
1982  113.5  3.5  11.0 
1983  121.8  2.5  10.0 
1984  148.0  12.5  11.0 
Thus major differences  in the investment  forecasts  result from dis- 
agreements about the measurement of the cost of funds, not taxes.  Did 
the cost  of funds  rise in the  1980s, as the authors of the FRB  model 
believe,  so as to offset the benefits of the tax reduction; or did it remain 
unchanged,  as  Sahling and Akhtar believe?  In a later section,  these 
ambiguities in measuring the cost of funds are discussed in greater detail. 
A Disaggregate  View 
The discussion of the effect of the tax system on capital formation has 
evolved  considerably  over the last decade.  In the mid- and late-1970s, 
much of the research emphasized  the interaction between  inflation and 
the tax system,  and reached the conclusion  that because  depreciation 
had  not  been  adjusted  for  inflation,  the  tax  on  capital  income  had 
increased  during the  1970s.9 This  discovery  motivated  much  of  the 
subsequent legislative effort to provide tax relief for capital income. 
More recently,  several studies have concluded that inflation has little 
or no net effect  on the tax rate applicable to new  investment,  and that 
that rate actually fell throughout the 1970s. 10  The discussion of tax policy 
9.  For a recent example,  see Martin Feldstein and Lawrence Summers, "Inflation and 
the Taxation of Capital Income in the Corporate Sector,"  National  Tax Joulrnal, vol.  32 
(December  1979), pp. 445-70. 
10.  Mervyn A. King and Don Fullerton, eds.,  The Taxation of Income from  Capital: 
A  Comparative  Study  of  the  United  States,  the  United  Kingdom,  Sweden,  and  West 
Germany (University  of  Chicago  Press,  The  National  Bureau of  Economic  Research, 
1984); Don Fullerton and Yolanda K. Henderson,  "Incentive  Effects of Taxes on Income 
from  Capital: Alternative  Policies  in the  1980s,"  in Charles  R.  Hulten  and Isabel  V. 
Sawhill, eds.,  The Legacy  of Reaganomics:  Prospects for Long-Term Growth (Washing- 
ton, D.C.,  Urban Institute Press,  1984), pp. 45-90. Barry P. Bosworth  11 
and investment  has now shifted to a new issue:  the wide dispersion  of 
effective  tax rates across different types of capital assets  and the highly 
variable effect that inflation has on the tax rates applicable to disparate 
investments financed in different ways.  For certain types of investment, 
the effective  tax rate is actually  reduced  by inflation; for others,  it is 
sharply increased.  The new concern  is not so much with the impact of 
taxes  on the total level  of investment,  as with the resource  distortions 
that result if investment  decisions  are based  more on tax advantages 
than on economic  benefits. 
This new research interest results from a fuller consideration  of the 
tax treatment of interest payments in an inflationary economy.  Nominal 
interest payments are a fully deductible business expense for borrowers. 
They  are also  taxable  income  to  recipients.  Inflation increases  both 
interest deductions and receipts,  but the impact on effective  tax rates is 
not  a wash,  because  far  more  interest  is  claimed  as  an expense  by 
borrowers  than is  ever  reported  as  taxable  income  by  recipients.  In 
addition,  the  marginal tax  rates of  borrowers  who  claim  the  interest 
deduction are higher, on average, than those of recipients. I  I As a result, 
the overall (corporate plus personal) tax rate on capital income  varies 
sharply by type of asset,  method of financing, and owner. 
Any  conclusions  about  specific  rates  of  overall  taxation  remain 
uncertain, however.  Our current tax system places only a modest burden 
on users of capital (borrowers) and collects  most of the revenue  from 
suppliers (lenders). This allocation may make little difference for calcu- 
lations of the overall  tax rate on capital income  in a closed  economy 
where savers and investors  can be viewed  simply as opposite  sides  of 
the  same  coin;  in an open  economy  with  international capital  flows, 
however,  the taxation of domestic  investors  and savers cannot simply 
be combined to obtain the overall tax rate.  '2 In fact, the major conclusion 
that emerges from the recent research is that the tax system is so diverse 
in its treatment of different investments  that its net influence on invest- 
ment decisions is virtually impossible to determine in any overall sense. 
The  1981-82 business  tax changes  offer an opportunity to examine 
the change in the allocation  of investment  among assets  with different 
business  tax  rates  before  and after  1982 and thus  to  obtain  specific 
11.  Fullerton and Henderson,  "Incentive  Effects of Taxes,"  p. 54. 
12. The need to assume a closed  economy  is a major limitation of those  studies that 
attempt to evaluate the combined effective rate of the personal and corporate income taxes 
on capital and their influence on investment decisions. 12  Brookings Paper-s oni  Economic Activity, 1  :1985 
evidence  of the impact of taxes  on investment  decisions.  Effective  tax 
rates on the income  from most types  of capital were  reduced,  but by 
widely varying amounts. A rapid expansion of total investment followed 
two years later. If taxes  have a major effect  on investment  decisions, 
those types of capital that had the largest reduction in effective  tax rates 
should have led the recovery.  Of course, the situation is not actually that 
simple,  because  the early  1980s have  seen enormous  changes  in other 
determinants of investment  demand: a large cyclical  swing in output, 
higher real interest  rates,  lower  inflation,  and a dramatic rise  in the 
foreign exchange  value  of the dollar. To the extent  that these  factors 
exert a common influence on all types of investment,  however,  a cross- 
section  comparison  should provide  more evidence  on the relative im- 
portance of taxes. 
Earlier studies,  using  specific  assumptions  about the sensitivity  of 
investment  to differential tax rates,  have examined  the efficiency  loss 
due to economic  distortions introduced by those differential rates. 13  My 
purpose is a more limited one of seeking empirical evidence  concerning 
the influence of taxes on the allocation of capital. 
The analysis  begins  with an initial assumption  (or null hypothesis) 
that changes  in the rental price of capital do not influence the demand 
for capital. I estimated a set of investment equations for the period 1958- 
80 using quarterly time series data on investment  in nineteen categories 
of PDE and two types of structures investment  taken from the national 
income accounts.  The structures investment  covers  only industrial and 
commercial  buildings,  not  public  utilities,  agriculture,  or  nonprofit 
institutions.  Net  investment  was related to a twelve-quarter  weighted 
average of the change in gross domestic output of the nonfarm, nonres- 
idential sector of the economy  (a simple accelerator  model) and a time 
trend to capture technological  changes. 14 I used the equations to forecast 
investment  from  1980 to  1984,  taking  the  cumulative  error in  each 
category during 1983 and 1984 as a measure of the unanticipated growth 
in the desired capital stock.  '5 
13.  Alan J. Auerbach, "Corporate Taxation in the United States,"  BPEA, 2:1983,  pp. 
451-505;  and Jane  G.  Gravelle,  "Effects  of  the  1981 Depreciation  Revisions  on  the 
Taxation of Income from Business  Capital," National  Tax Jouirnal, vol. 35 (March 1982), 
pp. 1-20. 
14.  The equations utilize a twelve-quarter polynomial lag with an adjustment for auto- 
correlation. 
15.  The 1981-82 period was excluded because of the rievision  of the tax law in 1982. In Barri-y  P. Bosworth  1  3 
The  distribution of forecast  errors,  shown  in column  1 of  table  3, 
resembles the earlier comparison,  in table 1, of current investment with 
investment  in  previous  cycles.  Office  equipment,  automobiles,  and 
commercial  structures all have large positive  errors, while other types 
of investment show a mixed pattern. 
The  hypothesis  is  that  the  errors  made  by  a  simple  accelerator 
investment  equation  that ignores  relative  prices  should be negatively 
correlated  with changes  in the  rental price of capital.  As  before,  the 
calculation  of  the  rental price  of  capital  on  an asset-specific  basis  is 
broken into three separate components:  the relative acquisition  price, 
the economic  cost  of using the capital for a specific period (the cost  of 
capital plus depreciation), and taxes,  all as they were defined previously 
in equation 1. 
TAXES 
In measuring the effect of taxes  on the rental price of capital, I took 
direct account of corporate taxes only. Changes in personal taxes should 
be reflected in market interest rates and thus in the cost of funds. Initially, 
the tax changes  from  1980 to  1982 were  evaluated  under an assumed 
constant real cost of funds of 4 percent and an expected  inflation rate of 
6 percent-an  after-tax nominal rate of 10  percent for purposes of valuing 
future depreciation allowances.  I disregarded state income and property 
taxes,  which are fairly uniform across assets  and do not change signifi- 
cantly in such a short period. 
The detailed information required to compute  the change in the tax 
component of the rental price between  1980 and 1982 is provided in the 
appendix. The results appear in columns 2 through 4 of table 3. To me, 
the major surprise was the small magnitude of the tax rate reduction for 
most types of equipment. Indeed, some classes  of assets,  such as office 
equipment (computers),  trucks,  and construction  machinery  actually 
faced a higher tax in 1982.  16 
1981 and 1982, firms might have intended to postpone  investment  until the provisions  of 
the 1981 act were fully phased in. 
16.  As discussed  in the appendix,  there is some uncertainty about the magnitude of 
the actual change in tax lives for depreciation because,  before 1981, firms were allowed to 
group dissimilar assets  and apply a common  depreciation  method.  In the  preliminary 
work, I used data on 1980 tax lives from three different studies, but the choice among them 
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One popular method of evaluating the effect of taxes on the demand 
for capital is based on computing effective  tax rates on net income from 
capital. 17  Measures of effective  tax rates under the tax laws of 1980 and 
post-1982 are shown in columns 2 and 3 of table 3. Column 2 illustrates 
the wide disparity of tax rates that existed  in 1980, ranging from  -  19 
percent for office equipment to 51 percent for industrial structures.  It 
also  appears,  from column  3,  that the  1981-82  tax  changes  together 
slightly reduced the dispersion  of tax rates. The standard deviation  of 
the  effective  tax  rates  falls  from  17 percentage  points  in  1980 to  12 
percentage points in 1982. 
In fact,  the effective  tax  rate does  not necessarily  provide  a good 
guide to the effect of taxes on the demand for capital because,  for short- 
lived assets,  depreciation  and the cost of funds dominate taxes as cost 
factors.  In evaluating  the  impact of  a tax  change  on the demand for- 
capital, it is more useful to look at the percentage change in the annual 
rental price  induced  by  the  tax  change.  That  calculation,  shown  in 
column 4, ranges from a 2 percent increase in the cost of using computer-s 
and construction  equipment to a 15 percent decline for structures. The 
average reduction in price (weighted by shares of the total capital stock) 
is about 4 percent. 18  If we assume uniform price elasticities of the desired 
capital  stock,  column  4  also  provides  the  measure  of  the  expected 
percentage change in the desired capital stock. 
ACQUJISITION  PRICES 
As  noted  earlier,  the price deflator for equipment  investment  rose 
after 1980 at a rate far below that of the general price level-contributing 
to  an  apparent  11 percent  decline  in  the  rental  price  of  equipment 
between  1980 and  1984.  An  examination  of  investment  on  a  more 
disaggregate  basis,  however,  reveals  that two-thirds  of that reported 
17.  The effective  tax rate is computed as the differ-ence between  the service  price of 
capital with and without taxes  (the tax wedge),  divided  by the before-tax  service  price 
minus economic  depreciation:  (c,  -  C)/(C  -  6). The effective  tax rate will vary under- 
different assumptions about the real after-tax rates of retur  n and inflation, which are set at 
4 percent and 6 percent, respectively,  in this study. 
18.  This estimate of the price effect of the tax change is considerably smaller than that 
assumed in the macroeconomic  models discussed  in the pr-ioI-  section.  The reason is that 
the FRB model assumes  a decline  in service  lives  used in depreciating equiprfient from 
10.5 to 4.5 years. On the basis of the detailed data shown in table 3, that seems excessive. Barn, P. Bosworth  17 
price decline was due to a simple shift in the mix of investment  toward 
assets  (computers and autos) whose  prices were relatively lower in the 
1980s than in 1972-the  base year for computing the price indexes in the 
national income  accounts.  On a fixed-weight  basis,  the price of PDE 
declined only 3 percent relative to that of output. 
Within that small average decline,  there was a wide diversity of price 
changes among assets,  as is evident in column 5 of table 3, which shows 
the percentage  change in prices from the average of  1979-80 to  1982- 
83.19 ("Price"  is the price index for each asset  divided by the price of 
output in the nonfarm, nonresidential business economy.) 
The  large relative  price  decline  for  office  equipment  is  expected, 
because  the national income accounts  incorporate the assumption that 
the price  deflator for computers  is  a constant  1.0.2? The  even  larger 
decline in the relative price of business  automobiles  is more surprising 
but can be explained.  While new car prices have been rising somewhat 
less rapidly than the general price level, the price index for used cars has 
exploded  upward. Businesses  typically  buy new automobiles  and sell 
them to private owners after a year or so. The sale of a capital good to 
the household  sector is treated as a negative investment  in the national 
income accounts.  Thus, the investment  price deflator reflects both low 
inflation for new automobiles  and rapid inflation at time of resale.2' In 
effect,  the cost  of using an automobile for a year or two has declined 
dramatically. 
Also surprisingly, the relative prices of most other types of equipment 
have  gone  up, despite  sharply increased  U.S.  purchases  of imported 
capital equipment.  The  average  price  of  imported  capital  goods  has 
remained unchanged  in recent  years.2" Finally,  the  relative  price  of 
19.  Initially, I measured the change from a weighted average of the price level where 
the weights were taken firom  the lag structure of the original investment equations for each 
asset.  However,  because  that calculation  yielded  results  very  similar to  those  of  the 
simpler procedure  of  computing  changes  in annual  averages,  I reverted  to  the  latter 
formulation.  A  one-year  lag is  used  as  a rough allowance  of  the gestation  period for 
investment. 
20.  Recent work by the Bureau of Economic  Analysis  to develop  a true price index 
suggests that a more accurate measure of the relative price decline would be at least twice 
that shown in the table. 
21.  In part, this reflects an inconsistency  in the data: new car prices are adjusted for 
quality changes; used car prices are not. 
22.  There is some question  about the quality of the price index data at this level  of 
detail, but there is no reason to expect that the biases in the data changed in any particular 
direction after 1980. One exception  should be noted.  Existing  price deflators for capital 
growth do not directly incorporate the price of imported equipment. 18  Brookings Papers on Economic Activitv, 1.1985 
structures, which had been steadily rising for decades, declined by nearly 
6 percent over the three-year period. 
COST  OF  FUNDS 
As I explained in the preceding section,  there is substantial disagree- 
ment among economists  about the change in the cost of funds after 1980. 
My approach was to experiment with a range of values  to test for the 
sensitivity  of the results to different alternatives.  For illustrative pur- 
poses,  a measure of the change in the rental price that would occur in 
each asset if the real cost of funds rose 2 percentage points is shown in 
column 6. The results demonstrate vividly the critical role that financing 
costs  play in determining what has happened to investment  incentives. 
The rental price changes in column 6 range from as low as 6 percent for 
computers and automobiles, whose prices are dominated by depreciation 
cost,  to a high of 32 percent for commercial  structures,  where annual 
depreciation  is small.  In fact,  the rental price varies far more due to 
changes in the cost of funds than to tax changes. 
RESULTS 
The forecast residuals of column 1 were expressed  as a percentage of 
the  respective  net capital  stock.  Simple  correlation  coefficients  were 
computed for the relationship between the error in forecasting the capital 
stock  and changes  in the various  constructed  measures  of the  rental 
price of capital and its components.  The possible combinations included: 
the change  in the tax  component  alone,  column  4; the change  in the 
acquisition price component  alone,  column 5; the change in the rental 
price due to the combined  effect  of tax and acquisition  price changes, 
with the assumption of no change in the cost of capital, column 7; and 
an alternative measure of the rental price that incorporates a rise in the 
cost of funds, column 8. The correlations,  weighted by the capital stock 
of each asset category,  were performed for the full set of 22 assets  and 
for a subset  (16 assets)  that excluded  farms,  equipment for regulated 
utilities, and mining. A summary of the F-statistics  and the significance 
from those correlations is provided opposite.23 
23.  The equations are shown in full in appendix table A-2. Barry P. Bosworth  19 
Acquisition  Rental  price 
Taxes  price  Version I  Version 2 
Full sample (22)  -0.7  26.7  9.1  17.5 
Restricted sample (16)  0.3  29.2  7.6  12.8 
Critical F value (0.01 level) 
22 cases  =  5.9 
16 cases  =  6.5 
First,  there  is no  significant correlation  between  those  assets  that 
have  a  higher-than-expected  capital  stock  and  the  relative  magni- 
tudes of tax reduction.  Second,  there is a strong correlation between 
changes  in the capital stock  and changes  in acquisition  prices,  but the 
significance level actually declines if the tax and acquisition price changes 
are combined into an overall measure of the rental price-taxes  make a 
negative contribution to explaining the pattern of forecast errors. Finally, 
the assumption that the cost of funds rose during the 1980s improves the 
explanation of the distribution of errors among assets,  even  though it 
implies that on average the rental price of capital actually rose, with the 
increase in financing cost offsetting the benefits of the tax reduction. 
These  statistical  results  support several  arguments that have  been 
made in other investment  studies.  First,  they  offer  evidence  for the 
hypothesis  implicit in the neoclassical  models  that the rental price of 
capital does influence the level and composition of investment spending. 
It appears, however,  that the literature places too much emphasis on the 
role of taxes and too little on the specification  of the cost of funds. For 
many categories of equipment, taxes are such a small component of the 
rental cost that they are overwhelmed  by changes in the other factors. 
Second,  it is possible  that the effect  of taxes  is still not accurately 
reflected in the analytical measures of the rental price used above because 
the measures  do not explicitly  incorporate  the role of debt finance.24 
That is a question to which I will return in a following section. 
Cost of Funds 
As mentioned,  existing  empirical studies  of the cost  of funds have 
reported widely divergent results. The FRB and Corcoran-Sahling (C-S) 
24.  Fullerton and Henderson,  "Incentive  Effects of Taxes." 20  Bo-ookinigs Papers  oni Econom-nic Activ'itv,  1.1985 
measures discussed  above are shown in figure 1, together with an earlier 
estimate  published  in  this journal  by  William C.  Brainard, John  B. 
Shoven,  and Laurence Weiss.25 All three measures have similar move- 
ments up to the mid-1970s. At that point there is a drastic departure. In 
the  Brainard,  Shoven,  and Weiss  model  (B-S-W),  the  cost  of  funds 
increases  because  of  the  decline  in stock  market values;  in  FRB,  it 
declines because of accelerating inflation; in C-S, it shows a mild upward 
drift. 
The disparities are puzzling because  all the studies profess  to begin 
with the same conceptual  model. The cost of funds is that discount rate 
(internal rate of return) required to equate the expected future stream of 
capital income,  E, to the present market value of the firm, V. The cost 
of funds is also  the opportunity cost  of drawing resources  from other 
uses.  In that  sense,  the  cost  of  funds  is  externally  determined,  and 
increases  in the cost  of funds raise the rate of return, the hurdle rate, 
that a specific project must earn in order to be economically  viable: 
(2)  Vo  f  ertEe  dt. 
If the expected  value of the future income stream can be captured in the 
concept of "permanent" capital income, E, then the cost of capital iS26 
E 
(3)  r  V 
or 
(4) 
PBT -  T +  INT 
S?  D 
where PBT equals equity  income  before  tax,  T equals taxes,  and INT 
equals interest payments.  The bar refers to the "permanent" value of a 
variable,  and S and D represent the market value  of equity  and debt, 
respectively. 
On the  further assumption  that dividends  are used  as  a  signal  to 
stockholders  of expected  "permanent"  (after-tax) equity  income,  the 
25.  William  C.  Brainard,  John  B.  Shoven,  and  Laurence  Weiss,  "The  Financial 
Valuation of the Return to Capital." BPEA, 2:1980, pp. 453-502. 
26.  Corcoran  and Sahling,  "The  Cost  of  Capital,"  pp.  25-26.  A  similar-  but more 
elaborate concept is used by Brainard, Shoven,  and Weiss. Barry P. Boswt  orth  21 
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"permanent" return to capital is a multiple, cx,  of dividends, plus interest, 
minus  the  loss  of  bondholders'  purchasing  power  due  to  expected 
inflation, rr;  and 
(5)  ~o  Dii  + INT  - 
irD 
The deduction of the inflation loss on debt (a gain to equity holders and 
the government) is an adjustment made by Corcoran and Sahling on the 
assumption  that it is captured  by  dividends  as  an index  of  expected 
future equity income.27 Equation 5 is the specification  implemented by 
Corcoran and Sahling for nonfinancial corporations. 
27.  This adjustment is explained further below. 22  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1985 
Alternatively, equation 5 can be rewritten to express the cost of funds 
as a weighted average of the return on equity and the return on debt: 
(6)  r =o  (v*  / 
S  )  +  iv/INT- 
rD  D 
D 
S  +  D 
(INT 
TrD 
The Federal Reserve uses a modified version of equation 6 by computing 
a weighted average of the corporate bond rate (tb)  on an after-tax basis 
and the dividend-price ratio (rdp), and setting  x =  2:28 
(7)  r =  cxr'p  w14 +  [(1 -  P)ib  -  ](1  -  vw). 
If the weight (w) equals S/(S  +  D), equation 7 is identical to equation 6. 
The FRB and C-S measures of the cost  of capital differ primarily in 
the estimate of expected  inflation that each uses to obtain a measure of 
the real return on debt. The FRB model uses a three-year average of past 
actual  inflation  rates  with  geometrically  declining  weights;  the  C-S 
version uses a straight five-year average.  As a result, the FRB measure 
of expected  inflation declines  rapidly with actual inflation after  1980, 
raising the real cost  of debt finance, while the C-S measure hangs at a 
much higher level. Between  1980  and 1984, the two models show a major 
discrepancy  of  4.5  percentage  points  in the  estimated  change  in the 
expected  rate of inflation. 
Moreover,  because  the FRB measure of the real cost of debt finance 
is so much lower than that for equity (which is twice the dividend-price 
ratio), shifts in the weights used to combine them have a large impact on 
the final estimate of the cost of capital.29  The weight assigned by FRB to 
debt declines  from 50 to 23 percent between  1980 and 1984. In C-S the 
debt share declines  less-from  39 to 35 percent over the same period- 
and the gap between  equity and debt cost  is smaller. The difference  in 
weights  exists  because  the FRB  model attempts  to measure  marginal 
rather than average financing costs.  The assumption is that at the margin 
firms shift rapidly away from debt finance when the real rate of interest 
rises relative to the dividend-price ratio. 
28.  C-S estimates  ot as the trend average of the ratio of dividends  to current period 
equity income (after-tax) plus the inflation loss to bondholders.  The average value of (x  is 
close  to the fixed value of 2.0 used in the FRB model, and it is not a significant source of 
difference. 
29.  The real payment on debt is not intended to measure the full cost of debt finance, 
because  the issuance  of debt imposes  greater risk on equity holders and should raise the 
dividend-price ratio. Bar  Yv  P.  Bosworth  23 
There are some interesting conceptual  differences  between  the two 
models.  The C-S study  adjusted the debt cost  for expected  inflation, 
even though such a correction is not required in equation 4. C-S made 
the adjustment because  it used the term otwDiv  as an index of expected 
real equity  earnings and needed  a true concept  of  equity  income  to 
compute o.  FRB goes  even further and reflects the tax deductibility of 
interest as it affects equity income.30 
If the reduction  in the  real interest  income  of bondholders  due to 
inflation is subtracted from the income of debt holders, it must be added 
to the return of government  and of  equity  holders.  Similarly the  tax 
saving from deducting interest expenses  accrues to equity holders. The 
definition of o then becomes 
PBT +  p  INT  + ir  D  -  T 
(8)  Ot  =  Div 
C-S makes the adjustment for inflation but not for the tax deduction of 
interest, and approximates cx  with a simple time trend. FRB makes both 
adjustments, but uses a fixed value of o equal to 2.0. 
A recent study by George Hatsopoulos  provides a further example of 
the uncertainty  surrounding empirical measures  of the cost  of funds. 
Hatsopoulos  argues that the cost  of funds,  and thus the rental price of 
capital, increased dramatically during the 1970s.31  He focuses  on the real 
cost of equity finance, r, but uses the same conceptual model of the cost 
of funds-market  value equals the discounted  value of expected  future 
income-as  B-S-W, FRB,  and C-S. Hatsopoulos  differs only in that he 
incorporates an assumption of an expected  exponential  growth rate, g, 
for dividends (adjusted for inflation), rather than a notion of "permanent" 
equity income:3' 
(9)  SO =  f  e-t  *  (Dilv *  ezt)  dt. 
30.  The required adjustments can be illustrated as a modification of equation 4: 
(4')  [PBT +  TrD  +  pINT] -  T +  [INT -  rrD] 
-  S+D 
31.  George N.  Hatsopoulos,  High  Cost of Capital: Handicap  of American Industry 
(American Business Conference, Inc., 1983). This study has been widely cited by advocates 
of further business tax reductions. 
32.  The computation of g is based on a large set of underlying ratios. See Hatsopoulos, 
High Cost of Capital, appendix C, for the details. 24  Brookings Papers oni  Economic Activity, 1  :1985 
Thus, 
Div 
(10)  r  S  g 
compared with the C-S and FRB formulation of 
(11)  r  =  Div 
Because  g is a constant  exponential  growth rate extending  forever 
into  the  future,  the  cost  of  equity  finance  is  very  sensitive  to  small 
variations in g and the current dividend-price  ratio. Furthermore, the 
method of computing g makes it relatively independent of variations in 
the dividend-price  ratio. The implicit assumption,  therefore,  is that a 
decline in stock market prices reflects a rise in r rather than a reduction 
in investors'  expectation  of future  dividends.  In fact,  Hatsopoulos's 
measure of r increases more than the rise in the dividend-price ratio over 
the  1970s, because  his estimate  of the expected  dividend growth rate 
rises from a low of 1.94 percent in 1969 to 2.86 percent in 1981, a period 
of severe recession. 
All of these  models illustrate the extreme difficulty of measuring the 
cost of funds, an unobserved variable, on the basis of equally unobserv- 
able expected  future returns. It is doubtful that the static multiplication 
of current dividends  by a historical  constant  or the computation  of a 
single  exponential  growth  rate  for  dividends  can  fully  capture  the 
dynamics of investor evaluations of future equity income prospects.  The 
cost  of funds is basically  an externally  determined measure reflecting 
investment alternatives elsewhere in the economy.  The effort to compute 
it as an internal rate of return makes the result highly dependent upon 
the method of projecting the future dividend stream. 
More interesting is the relationship between  the issue  of what hap- 
pened to the cost of funds and the issue of why q, the ratio of the market 
value  of  corporations  to  the  replacement  cost  of  their assets,  fell  so 
dramatically beginning in 1974. The connection  between  the two con- 
cepts is made evident by restating q as the expected  return from physical 
capital divided by the cost of funds: 
(12)  q  (EIK) 
(E/V), Barry.  P. Boswt'orth  25 
The B-S-W measure sees the fall in q as a reflection of the change in 
investor valuation of the income  stream, a rise in the cost of funds. By 
contrast, the C-S version finds little change in the cost of funds, implying 
that the decline in q must result from a lower productivity of the existing 
capital stock. Since the FRB version shows a substantial fall in the cost 
of funds  after  1973, it implies  an even  more  dramatic decline  in the 
marginal productivity of capital. On the other hand, the FRB measure 
of the cost  of funds rises  sharply in the  1980s, while  q remains low, 
suggesting that the productivity of capital has turned around and now is 
rising. 
The study by Brairiard, Shoven,  and Weiss is a much more elaborate 
effort than either C-S or FRB to estimate expected future capital income. 
However,  the structure of the equation used to project earnings excludes 
the possibility of a major decline in the rate of return on capital, forcing 
the fall in q to be reflected in a rise in the cost of capital.33 
The measure of q implied by the market value data used by C-S is 
shown in table 4. The rise in q during the  1950s and 1960s and its fall 
during the  1970s  closely  parallels  the  course  of  q  found  by  other 
researchers.34 In addition, while the expected  return on existing capital 
is no more measurable than the cost of capital from the financial side, it 
is possible  to calculate  the annual before- and after-tax rates of return 
on capital for nonfinancial corporations. Those measures are also shown 
on both an actual and a cyclically  adjusted basis in table 4.35 
A simple inspection  of the data lends some  support to the argument 
that much of the fluctuation in q can be accounted for by changes in the 
33.  This restriction is pointed out by the authors. It may be appropriate for their sample 
of firms, because  there is less evidence  of a decline in the riate of return on capital for the 
sample than for the total on nonfinancial corporations.  See Brainard, Shoven,  and Weiss, 
"The Financial Valuation, " pp. 463-64.  However,  they did encounter sever-e  measurement 
problems  in  constructing  the  appropriate  data  on  an  individual  firm basis,  and  the 
differences between their measure of the rate of return earned by their sample of 187 firms 
and that for the  total of  all nonfinancial corporations  may  reflect those  measurement 
problems. 
34.  See Brainard, Shoven,  and Weiss,  "The Financial Valuation,"  p. 466. 
35.  The rate of retul-n  is based on capital income data from the national income accounts 
and the balance sheet data of the Flow of Funds Division of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve  System.  The definition of K includes  the replacement value of tanlgible 
assets  (structures,  equipment,  and inventories,  plus land) and net noninterest-bear-ing 
financial assets.  The cyclical adjustment is based on a regression rielating the rate of rieturn 
to the utilization of potential GNP and annual changes  in GNP as described in Barry P. 
Bosworth,  "Capital Formation and Economic  Policy,"  BPEA, 2:1982, p. 292. 26  Brookings Paper-s on Economic Activity, 1.:1985 
Table 4.  Financial Variables for Nonfinancial Corporations, 1952-84 
Percent unless  otherwise  specified 
Rate of retlurn 
Before  tax  After tax 
q  Cost of  Cyclically  Cyclically 
Year  (ratio)  funds  Actuial  adjlusted  Actual  adjlusted 
1952  0.60  8.3  9.3  8.4  4.0  3.6 
1953  0.57  8.5  8.8  7.9  3.6  3.2 
1954  0.69  7.4  8.1  9.6  3.9  4.8 
1955  0.81  6.6  10.1  9.1  5.0  4.4 
1956  0.79  6.8  8.7  8.9  4.0  4.2 
1957  0.69  7.0  7.9  8.2  3.8  4.1 
1958  0.80  6.5  6.7  8.3  3.4  4.3 
1959  0.88  5.6  8.4  7.9  4.4  4.0 
1960  0.85  5.8  7.7  8.2  4.1  4.4 
1961  1.00  5.2  7.6  8.4  4.1  4.5 
1962  0.86  5.8  8.6  8.2  5.1  4.8 
1963  1.03  5.6  9.3  9.3  5.5  5.5 
1964  1.12  5.4  10.1  9.5  6.2  5.9 
1965  1.22  5.4  11.1  10.1  7.0  6.4 
1966  0.96  6.0  11.1  9.6  7.0  6.2 
1967  1.03  5.7  9.9  9.5  6.4  6.2 
1968  1.14  5.5  9.9  8.8  5.9  5.3 
1969  0.95  5.7  8.7  8.2  5.1  4.9 
1970  0.83  6.4  6.9  7.7  4.2  4.7 
1971  0.84  5.4  7.4  7.4  4.6  4.7 
1972  0.99  5.0  7.9  7.1  5.0  4.5 
1973  0.86  5.3  7.9  6.7  4.8  4.1 
1974  0.57  6.6  6.1  7.1  3.3  4.0 
1975  0.65  6.5  6.6  8.6  4.3  5.4 
1976  0.73  5.8  7.2  7.2  4.4  4.3 
1977  0.62  6.2  7.7  7.3  4.9  4.6 
1978  0.63  6.8  7.6  7.1  4.8  4.5 
1979  0.55  7.4  6.7  6.7  4.1  4.1 
1980  0.58  7.9  5.8  7.1  3.6  4.4 
1981  0.53  8.3  6.3  6.9  4.4  4.8 
1982  0.55  8.8  5.3  7.8  4.1  5.5 
1983  0.63  6.9  6.4  7.5  4.9  5.4 
1984  0.65  7.9  8.1  7.6  6.3  5.9 
Sources:  Author's  calculations  as  explained  in text  based  on  data from national  income  and product accounts, 
table  1.13; Board of Governors  of the Federal Reserve  System,  "Balance  Sheets  for the  U.S.  Economy  1945-83''; 
and unpublished data from the Federal Reserve  Bank of New  York. The  1984 data are preliminary. Barry P. Bosworth  27 
rate of return on capital. The argument is particularly true if we assume 
that investors,  observing the rise of reported earnings in the 1960s and 
their fall in the 1970s, expected  those trends to continue.  Between  1965- 
68 and 1978-79, q declined by about 50 percent. During the same period, 
the  after-tax  rate  of  return  (cyclically  adjusted)  declined  about  30 
percent-not  enough  to  explain  the  full  decline  in  q.  It  would  be 
reasonable,  however,  to argue that there was some increase in the cost 
of funds during the 1970s. Higher inflation and other sources of increased 
economic  uncertainty  make such  an increase  likely,  and the measure 
reported by C-S does  rise,  after all, from an average of 5.6 percent in 
1965-68 to 7 percent in 1978-79. The point is that it is not necessary  to 
assume  a  drastic  revision  in  investor  evaluations  of  capital  income 
prospects in order to account for the decline in q. 
This does not help much to determine what actually happened to the 
cost of funds during the early 1980s. It does,  however,  suggest extreme 
caution  in the use  of  some  of the current measures  in evaluating  the 
change in investment  incentives  during the period.  It is interesting  to 
note, from table 4, that there is no major recovery  during the  1980s in 
either q or the before-tax  rate of return on existing  assets  that would 
suggest a major change of future capital income prospects.  On the other 
hand, the 1981 tax act did i-educe tax liabilities of firms to the point that 
by  1984 the after-tax return on existing  capital had regained the peak 
level of the mid-1960s. If investors  realize,  however,  that this surge in 
corporate cash flow is largely a transitory phenomenon related to changes 
in  the  timing  of  depreciation  allowances  made  by  the  1981-82  tax 
changes, there should be no proportionate change in the value of q. 
Taxation  and Debt Finance 
One  of  the  most  consistent  findings  of  studies  of  capital  income 
taxation is that income  from structures  investments  is taxed  at a far 
higher rate than that from equipment.  One reason for the higher rate is 
that equipment investments  receive  an investment  tax credit. Another 
is that because  depreciation  allowances  are not indexed  for inflation, 
long-lived structures have high effective  tax rates. The phenomenon  is 28  Br  ookings Paper s oni  Economic Activity, 1  :1985 
evident  in table  3: the  tax  rate on  structures  is  close  to  35 percent, 
whereas many categories of equipment have negative rates of taxation. 
In view of this fact, it is puzzling that structures investments  are often 
described as especially good vehicles for tax shelter-implying  that they 
offer  greater-than-average  tax  benefits.  Indeed,  when  the  Treasury 
proposed,  in November  1984, to equalize the tax treatment of different 
assets,  it was  the  real estate  industry  that opposed  the reform most 
vigorously.  Buyers  and producers  of  equipment  investments  seemed 
less concerned-citing  the advantages of the proposed lower overall tax 
rates. 
One possible resolution of this paradox emerges from a consideration 
of the influence  of debt finance on effective  tax rates.  By  means  of a 
model that combines  the provisions  of the corporate and the personal 
income  tax  codes,  Don  Fullerton  and  Yolanda  K.  Henderson  have 
shown that the effective  tax rate on corporate capital income varies from 
64 to  -  85 percent,  depending upon the proportion of equity and debt 
finance.36 Debt financing imparts a tax subsidy  because  the firms that 
deduct interest as an expense  have higher marginal tax brackets than the 
recipients of the interest income. 
Studies  that  compare  effective  tax  rates  across  assets,  however, 
normally incorporate a common rate of debt finance. What they do not 
consider is the possibility  that some types of assets  are inherently more 
compatible with higher rates of debt finance than are others.  If the rate 
of debt finance were allowed  to vary across  assets,  the distribution of 
tax burdens would be quite different from that shown in columns 2 and 
3 of table 3. 
In order to highlight the role of debt finance, it is useful to focus  on 
the investment decision from the perspective  of the equity holder.37  The 
equity investor has after-tax income equal to the after-tax rental receipts 
on the project plus depreciation  allowances,  and expenses  of interest 
and principal repayments on the portion of the asset financed by debt. 
Nominal interest payments are tax deductible.  The debt-equity ratio is 
assumed  to be maintained at a constant  proportion,  ?,  of the asset's 
36.  Fullerton and Henderson,  "Incentive  Effects of Taxes,"  pp. 76-77.  Their analysis 
assumes the absence  of risk. 
37.  The  basic  model  is  taken  fiom  Charles  Hulten,  "An  Analysis  of  the  167(k) 
Accelerated  Depreciation Program," Working Paper (Urban Institute, May 27, 1983), pp. 
13-16. I have made some changes to simplify the presentation. Bary  P. Boswiorth  29 
value over its life. The asset  must generate a net income  stream that is 
equal in present value terms to the equity holder's share of its acquisition 
price: 
(1)  (1  -(-k-pK)Pk  e - (7:?s  [(I - p) c  Pq 
-  [1  -  p) i  +  (8  6-r)]4k]  ds. 
The first part of this expression  (and the definition of the terms) is the 
same as that typically used to derive the standard measure of the rental 
price given in equation  1. The difference  lies in the additional after-tax 
cost  to  investors  of  interest  and  principal  repayments,  (1 -  p)i and 
(8 -  n), respectively.38 As an offset to these costs,  the present value of 
the net income must cover only the equity share, (1 -  4), of the purchase 
price.  Finally,  the discount  rate, r, has a different interpretation here 
than in earlier sections  of the paper because it applies only to the stream 
of  equity  income.  For the  present,  it can  be  viewed  as  the  after-tax 
opportunity cost of investment in alternative assets of comparable risk. 
The solution  of the above  expression  yields  a new definition of the 
rental price of capital: 
(14)  6[  )  1Ppz-k  l  (1-p)  i 
The only difference from equation  1 is the addition of the debt finance 
term. If the asset  is all equity financed (4  =  0), the rental price is the 
same  as  before.  It would  also  be  the  same-and  there  would  be  no 
advantage  to  debt  finance-in  a world  where  the  after-tax  return to 
equity, r, and the borrowing rate, (1 -  p)i -  ar,  are equal.39 
In general, however,  the return to equity will exceed  the borrowing 
rate. If there is initially no debt finance, the equity holders will require a 
return, r, that exceeds  that of riskless debt, as compensation for assuming 
the risk of a variable return.40  In the case of perfect capital markets, that 
risk premium, ox,  can be reduced to the limits of the asset's  systematic 
38.  Principal repayments rise with depreciation and fall with the inflation rate. 
39.  This is the modified Fisher rule of Feldstein-Darby  that, in a world with taxes, 
market interest rates must change  more than proportionately  with respect  to expected 
inflation. 
40.  I have ignored any potential differences  in the taxation of debt and equity income 
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risk. As the proportion of debt in the financial structure is increased, 
equity  holders  will  require a  higher  return as  compensation  for  the 
increased risk per dollar of invested capital. In a world without taxes the 
rise in r is just sufficient to offset the effects  of debt leverage,  and debt 
finance has no effect on the rental price.41 
Under present tax law, however,  firms can increase the value of the 
overall project by issuing debt. Since the interest payments are deductible 
for tax purposes,  the government's  return is reduced  and that of the 
equity holders increased. The result is that an increase in debt will reduce 
the required rental price of capital.42  In fact, as long as firms can borrow 
at the riskless  rate, all investment  should be financed with debt.  The 
interaction of the tax law and debt finance does not lead to any one asset 
being favored over another, however. 
Several arguments have been put forth to explain why in practice the 
optimal  financial structure might stop  short of  all debt  finance.43 All 
hinge upon the introduction of an additional cost element that is positively 
related to debt,  or it is assumed  that risk, and thus the discount  rate, 
rises as a function of debt by more than the pure effect of debt leverage. 
A common  means of doing so is to assume that there is significant risk 
of  bankruptcy  proceedings  and  reorganization,  and  that  the  risk  of 
bankruptcy increases with the probability of a negative cash flow.44 
Bankruptcy risks can be incorporated into the measure of the rental 
price by the addition, in equation 13, of a term,  3f(4(),  to the expression 
for net cash flow. The proportionate loss of asset value that results from 
41.  This is demonstrable in equation  14 by eliminating the tax parameters and setting 
r =  i +  [cl/(l  -  O)] -  wr.  The result simply reflects the Modigliani-Miller theorem that in 
the absence  of taxes  the overall riskiness  and value of an investment  project cannot be 
altered by changes in its financing. 
42.  Robert E. Hall, "Tax Treatment of Depreciation,  Capital Gains, and Interest in an 
Inflationary  Economy,"  in  Charles  R.  Hulten,  ed.,  Depreciation,  Inflation,  and  the 
Taxation of Income from  Capital (Washington,  D.C.,  Urban Institute Press,  1981), pp. 
161-66. 
43.  For a summary see Alan Auerbach,  "Taxation,  Corporate Financial Policy,  and 
the Cost of Capital," Jolurnal of Economic  Literature, vol. 21 (September  1983), pp. 905- 
40. The relationship between  debt finance and risk is discussed  in Roger H. Gordon and 
Burton G. Malkiel, "Corporation Finance,"  in Henry J. Aaron and Joseph A. Pechman, 
eds.,  How Taxes Affect Economic Behavior (Brookings Institution,  1981), pp. 131-92. 
44.  Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Taxation, Corporate Financial Policy, and the Cost of Capital," 
Journal  of  Public  Economics,  vol.  2 (February  1973), pp.  1-34;  Gordon and Malkiel, 
"Corporation Finance." Barty P. Bosworth  3  1 
bankruptcy is measured by 13;f(4)  is the expectation  of such an event. 
The net rental price is 
(15)  c  Pk F  (I  pz  -k)  r-(l-p)  i +  + Pf()1  (15)  c=- 
_  (i+6)-  I  . 
A simplified version  of equation  15 that illustrates the role of bank- 
ruptcy  costs  is  obtained  by  assuming  that  tax  depreciation  equals 
economic depreciation so that z =  6!(r +  6), that there is no investment 
tax credit, and that the relative price of capital is unity. Furthermore, 
with full capital market diversification,  the  required return to  equity 
holders is simply 
1  + 
Thus, 
(15')  (i-p  i-  r  +  (x +  + Mf( 
i-p  i-p 
The  effects  of  a  marginal increase  in  debt  finance  is  shown  by 
differentiating equation 15' with respect to 4: 
(16)  ac =  pi _p(f  ai +f ,f(0 
a  I  i-p  I-p p  i-p 
The  first term represents  the  tax  benefits  of  borrowing.  It is  also 
possible, as represented by the second term, that the borrowing rate will 
rise  because  lenders  no  longer  believe  that they  are fully  protected 
against risk. In that case,  the investor loses the advantage of a widening 
financial margin, and the  rental price  of  capital  increases  with  debt 
finance; thus the model admits the possibility  of an optimal degree of 
debt leverage short of unity. The issue of lender risk is closely connected 
with bankruptcy risk, however,  so the third term is more interesting. 
The inclusion of bankruptcy costs  implies that the optimal degree of 
leverage depends both upon the actual costs of bankruptcy and upon the 
extent to which its probability is an increasing function of the leverage 
ratio. An increase in contractual payments to the bondholders increases 
the probability of bankruptcy because it reduces the firm's net cash flow. 
The probability will also differ among assets depending upon the variance 
of  the expected  income  stream.  Since  that variance  can  be  reduced 
through diversification, however, the probability is probably best thought 
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Whatever the probability of bankruptcy, its actual cost will still vary 
among assets depending upon the quality of the available resale markets. 
If the remaining value of the asset's  income  stream can be easily  sold, 
the costs  of bankruptcy should be limited to legal and administrative 
fees. Thus, bankruptcy costs should impose a relatively minor limitation 
on debt finance for assets  such as commercial real estate,  automobiles, 
and aircraft, which have active resale markets with considerable depth. 
Other assets,  however,  are tailored to the specific uses of their current 
owners  and have few  alternative uses-implying  a very limited resale 
market. They take on the risk characteristics of the firm as a whole. 
The rental cost is minimized when the marginal costs  of bankruptcy 
equal the tax benefits of another increment of debt, pi. If equation  16 is 
set equal to zero and 6i!86  =  0, 
(17)  PP'(  =  pi. 
This balancing of the marginal costs  and benefits is shown in figure 2 for 
two assets  that differ in their bankruptcy costs.  There will be an initial 
range  of  debt  finance  that  will  have  no  appreciable  effect  on  the 
probability of default. After that point the firms will pursue debt financing 
until the increasing  marginal costs  of bankruptcy are equal to the tax 
wedge between the risk-adjusted return on equity and debt finance; this 
occurs at points AI and A2 in the figure. While the costs and benefits will 
be equated at the margin, there will be inframarginal  benefits, represented 
in the  figure by  the  area between  the  cost  of  equity  finance  and the 
marginal costs  of debt finance. The differential advantage of the asset 
with low bankruptcy costs is represented by the shaded area. 
The magnitude of those inframarginal returns can be substantial. For 
example,  assume investors  require a real return of 4 percent on equity 
and 2 percent on riskless bonds, and that the inflation rate is 4 percent. 
At a tax  rate of  50 percent,  a  10 percentage  point differential in the 
leverage  rate  between  two  assets  would  translate  into  a  3  percent 
reduction in the rental price for office equipment, which has a high rate 
of depreciation, but a 12 percent reduction for commercial structures. It 
would cut the effective  tax rate on an asset such as commercial buildings 
by 12 percentage points.45 
45.  A risk differential of 2 percentage points is the average value reported in Brainard, 
Shoven,  and Weiss,  "The Financial Valuation,"  p. 482. In addition, there were periods in 
the  1970s when very low implicit real interest rates in markets implied a larger return to 
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Figure 2.  Marginal Costs and Benefits of Debt Finance 
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Even if the marginal costs  of bankruptcy are assumed to rise linearly 
from the point of zero debt to the optimal debt ratio (A, and A2 in figure 
2), the net reduction (tax saving minus increased bankruptcy risk) in the 
rental price would be cut by only 50 percent.  Data are not available to 
compute  the leverage  ratio, 4, on either an asset  or industry basis.  A 
rough estimate  of the potential range of differences,  however,  can be 
found by computing the share of net interest payments in capital income 
(interest, profits, and proprietor income)  at the industry level.  Such a 
computation understates the level of 4)  by failing to adjust for differences 
in rates  of  return between  debt  and  equity.  Still,  differences  in the 
reliance on debt finance are substantial.  The share of income going to 
bondholders  varies  from  a  low  of  10 percent  in  manufacturing and 
services to a high of 70 percent in real estate.  Industries such as mining, 
communications,  and transportation are in an intermediate range of 30 
percent. 
Generally,  the finance literature has emphasized  the link between 
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earnings. It has given less consideration to the influence of asset-specific 
factors such as the depth of resale markets. Differences among assets in 
the optimal degree of debt finance would exist  even  in the absence  of 
taxes.  As a result,  it can be highly misleading to evaluate  the relative 
burden of a tax system that rewards debt finance under the assumption 
of equal rates of debt leverage across firms and assets.46 
Summary 
The major finding of this paper is that there is room for doubt about 
the  role  of  the  1981-82  tax  reduction  in  the  recovery  of  business 
investment  in  1983-84.  Total  investment  has  increased  substantially 
since the recession,  but the expansion  has been far more uneven  than 
generally  recognized:  more than 90 percent  of the growth in business 
investment  since  1979 is due to a rise in outlays  for office equipment, 
business automobiles,  and commercial structures. 
I found no correlation between  the growth in specific  categories  of 
investment  and the relative  magnitude of tax reduction by asset.  For 
example,  there was no significant tax reduction for either automobiles 
or computers; and spending on commercial buildings rose while invest- 
ment in industrial structures declined,  although both had equally large 
tax reductions.  One reason why the 1981-82 tax cut had so little effect 
is that it produced a smaller overall reduction in effective  tax rates on 
capital income than is generally thought. The liberalization of deprecia- 
tion allowances  greatly increases  corporate cash flow in the short run, 
but it has a smaller effect on the price of an asset over its lifetime. 
The absence  of any correlation between  changes  in investment  and 
changes  in  tax  rates  need  not  imply  that  the  neoclassical  model  of 
investment  behavior  is wrong in its focus  on changes  in the price of 
capital. When measures of changes in the rental price of capital between 
1980 and 1984 include acquisition prices and the cost of funds, they show 
a significant correlation with the pattern of investment  growth.  Taxes 
are often simply outweighed as a determinant of the rental price of capital 
by changes in acquisition prices and the cost of funds. 
46.  It is also interesting to note that if high debt leverage is more compatible with low 
risk assets,  the  interest  deduction  feature  of  the  corporate  tax may act  to discourage 
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It is virtually impossible  at the empirical level  to reach a conclusion 
as to whether incentives  for investment have increased during the early 
1980s. There is too much uncertainty about the direction, much less the 
magnitude, of change in the cost of funds. The vexed  issue of financing 
costs,  however,  cannot be divorced from the evaluation of the effects of 
the 1981-82 tax act on investment.  The tax reduction contributed to the 
current federal budget deficit and is, in part, responsible  for the rise in 
market interest rates. 
Finally, the explanation for the lack of correlation between  changes 
in the pattern of investment and changes in relative tax rates may be that 
the  tax  rate  measures  are  wrong.  Specifically,  the  commonly  cited 
calculations  of  relative  tax  burdens  ignore  variations  by  asset  in the 
reliance on debt financing. It is, however,  demonstrable that some types 
of assets-those  with low variance of future incomes and well-developed 
resale markets-are  inherently more compatible than others with a high 
degree of debt leverage,  and that the use of debt finance for such assets 
provides tax benefits. On the basis of plausible parameters it is possible 
to conclude that assets  such as commercial real estate have low or even 
negative rates of taxation,  even  though the standard conclusion  of the 
investment  literature  is  that  they  are  heavily  taxed.  That  standard 
conclusion  seems  more appropriate for assets  such as industrial struc- 
tures, which have a limited value in resale markets. 
In recent years  economists  have directed considerable  attention  to 
distortions  in the allocation  of capital induced  by differential rates of 
taxation among assets.47 The tax system  has become  so complex  that 
the interaction of provisions  intended to promote certain activities  may 
result in far different outcomes in practice. The effort to create a simpler, 
more uniform structure of capital income  taxation  should be a major 
objective of future reform efforts . The findings of this paper make it clear 
that the short-term incentive  effects  of tax changes are relatively small 
and frequently overwhelmed  by other developments.  If the tax system 
is to encourage efficiency,  it must be made to do so over the long haul. 
47.  Many of the issues raised by a consideration  of alternative financial arrangements 
in evaluating capital income taxation are discussed  in C. Eugene Steuerle,  Taxes, Loans, 
and Inflation: How the Nation's  Wealth Becomes  Misallocated  (Brookings,  1985). 36  Brookings Papers oni  Economic Activity, 1:1985 
APPENDIX 
Data Sources 
THIS  APPENDIX describes data sources and presents two tables. Table 
A-1 shows tax parameters  by assets, and table A-2 displays regression 
equations  for investment  by assets. 
The calculation  of the rental  price of capital  required  tax information 
by asset category  for both 1980  and 1982.  The calculation  for 1982  was 
quite  simple  because the 1981-82  tax act reduced  the number  of possible 
asset categories to four (assets with three-, five-, ten-, and fifteen-year 
service lives) and specified  an annual  schedule of depreciation  for each 
category. Since some of the asset groupings  used in the national  income 
accounts span  two tax categories,  it was necessary  to compute  weighted 
averages. 
The calculation for 1980 was a different matter. Under the asset 
depreciation  range  (ADR)  system, firms  were allowed  to group  relatively 
heterogeneous  assets and  apply  a common  depreciation  schedule.  Thus, 
actual service lives varied depending  upon the industry in which the 
asset was used. There are three published  estimates of service lives by 
asset; all differ  in the interpretation  of the data.48  In addition,  firms  were 
influenced  in their choice of the service life to use in computing  depre- 
ciation  by the fact that longer-lived  equipment  received a larger  invest- 
ment  tax credit.  Thus, they had  to choose a combination  that  minimized 
their  tax liability.  In individual  cases the discrepancies  between  the three 
sources are quite substantial.  In general,  Fullerton  and  Henderson  used 
longer  tax service lives in 1980  and  shorter  lives in 1982,  maximizing  the 
impact of the 1981-82 tax changes. The data from Jane Gravelle and 
Robert  Lucke are in close agreement.  The tax measures  used in the text 
are based largely  on the series from Lucke and are shown in table A-1. 
The choice of a specific  series, however, does not significantly  affect  the 
analysis reported  in the text. The measures of economic depreciation 
are  from  a study by Charles  R. Hulten  and Frank  C. Wykoff.49 
48. One set, based on work by Jorgensen and Sullivan, was published in Fullerton and 
Henderson,  "Incentive  Effects of Taxes,"  p. 57. A second  set was reported in Gravelle, 
"Effects  of the  1981 Depreciation  Revisions,"  p. 8. The third series was obtained from 
Robert Lucke, of the Congressional Budget Office. 
49. The specific series was taken from Fullerton and Henderson,  "Incentive  Effects 
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Table A-1.  Tax Parameters by Asset Category 
1980  law}  1982  law 
Depreciatiotn  Investment  Investment 
Asset category  rate  Service  life  tax credit  Service  life  tax credit 
Fui-nituie  0.110  8.0  0.100  5.0  0.100 
Fabricated metals  0.092  13.7  0.100  8.0  0.100 
Engines and turbines  0.079  19.2  0.100  10.0  0.100 
Construction tractors  0.163  8.1  0.090  5.0  0.100 
Agricultural machinery  0.097  8.0  0.100  5.0  0.100 
Construction equipment  0.172  7.0  0.100  5.0  0.100 
Mining equipment  0.165  9.8  0.100  5.0  0.100 
Metalworking machinery  0.123  9.4  0.100  5.0  0.100 
Special industrial machinery  0.103  8.7  0.100  4.8  0.090 
General industrial machinery  0.123  11.1  0.100  6.1  0.100 
Office equipment  0.273  7.0  0.100  5.0  0.100 
Service  industry equipment  0.165  8.2  0.100  5.2  0.100 
Communications  and electrical  0.118  12.6  0.100  7.3  0.100 
Trucks and buses  0.254  5.0  0.067  4.4  0.088 
Business  automobiles  0.333  3.0  0.033  3.0  0.060 
Aircraft  0.183  9.2  0.100  5.0  0.100 
Ships and boats  0.075  15.6  0.100  5.0  0.100 
Railroad equipment  0.066  11.0  0.100  5.0  0.100 
Instruments  0.150  11.4  0.100  6.7  0.100 
Other equipment  0.150  8.7  0.100  5.0  0.100 
Industrial structures  0.033  35.0  0.000  15.0  0.000 
Commercial structures  0.023  35.0  0.000  15.0  0.000 
Source: Author's  calculations  from  data  supplied  by Charles  R. Hulten.  of the Urban  Institute,  and  Robert  Lucke, 
of the Congressional  Budget  Office. 
Table A-2.  Regression Equations for Investment by Asset and Changes in the Rental 
Price of Capital by Asset 
Rental 
Source  of change  price 
in rental price  Constant  coefficient  R2  F statistic 
Full sample  (22 cases) 
Taxes  0.07  -0.07  0.04  -0.70 
Acquisition  price  0.28  -0.30  0.57  26.65 
Rental price-Ia  0.13  -0.14  0.31  9.08 
Rental price-2b  0.25  -0.24  0.47  17.53 
Restricted  sample  (16 cases) 
Taxes  0.02  -  0.01  0.01  0.25 
Acquisition  price  0.35  -0.36  0.68  29.21 
Rental price-Ia  0.15  -  0.18  0.35  7.63 
Rental price-2b  0.27  -0.25  0.48  12.75 
Source:  Equations  based  on  data  in table  3.  Regressions  are  weighted  by  the  net capital  stock.  The  restricted 
sample excludes  fabricated metals, turbines, agriculture machinery, tractors, mining machinery, and communications 
and electrical  equipment. 
a.  Includes combined effect  of taxes  and acquisition  price changes. 
b.  Includes two percentage point increase  in cost  of funds. 38  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1985 
In computing the present value of depreciation allowances  in 1980, I 
assumed  that firms used  an optimal combination  of double-declining 
balance and sum-of-the-years  digits for equipment,  and a combination 
of  150 percent  of  declining  balance  and straight-line depreciation  for 
structures.50 The schedules  under 1982 law are those  published by the 
Treasury Department. 
50.  The formulas were taken from Don  Fullerton and Yolanda Henderson,  "Long- 
Run Effects  of the Accelerated  Cost Recovery  System,"  Working Paper 828 (National 
Bureau of Economic  Research,  1981). 
51. The schedules were taken from Joint Committee on Taxation, General/Explanation 
of the Economic Recovery Act of 1981, 97 Cong.  1 sess.  (GPO, 1981), pp. 80-84. Comments 
and Discussion 
John B.  Shoven:  Barry Bosworth's  paper offers a challenge  to those 
who argue that the 1981 business  tax cuts are the cause of the strength 
in business  investment  in the 1982-84 economic  expansion.  It confirms 
that the growth in investment  has indeed been unusually great, a fact 
that is consistent  with the tax cut hypothesis.  In fact, Bosworth  shows 
that the growth in GNP in the period  1982-84 was  normal for the first 
two  years  of  a  recovery,  whereas  the  growth  in  producer  durable 
equiptnent was  more than twice  as great as usual.  Actually,  capacity 
utilization  has recovered  more  slowly  than usual,  so  investment-per- 
unit recovery  may be even  more impressive  than the paper indicates. 
The composition  of the growth in investment,  however,  is inconsistent 
with  the  pattern  of  the  cuts  in  effective  marginal tax  rates.  Office 
equipment (computers) and business  automobiles  have been especially 
strong in this recovery,  and have accounted for an astounding 93 percent 
of the growth of investment  in all producers'  durable equipment since 
1979. These two categories of investment,  however,  did not benefit from 
large tax cuts in 1981  and 1982. In fact, the marginal tax rate on investment 
in computers actually increased, while that on autos fell, but only by 1.4 
percent. 
The evidence  certainly does seem inconsistent  with the idea of a tax- 
cut-driven investment boom. There are, however,  definitional problems. 
Whether the purchase of a car shows up as a business  investment  or as 
the acquisition of a consumer  durable by a household  depends  on the 
financing arrangement. The problem is that leasing a car is a very close 
substitute  for  financing  it  through  a  bank  or  a  dealer.  Investment 
statistics, however, treat leasing as very different from the other financing 
alternatives. With a lease,  the car shows up as a business investment on 
the  part of  the  leasing  company,  which  can  take  advantage  of  the 
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investment tax credit and accelerated depreciation. I have the impression 
that leasing has been gaining in popularity, possibly because of the lower 
monthly payments  typically  offered in leasing,  or possibly  because  of 
the tax treatment of leasing. The paper mentions this definitional problem 
but does not offer any statistics to help the reader to assess its importance. 
The related problem with office equipment is that home computers 
are included  in the figures.  Again,  what is often  a consumer  durable 
shows  up as a business  investment.  How  significantly this distorts the 
business  numbers  is  again  not  easily  determined,  but  clearly  home 
computers have enjoyed an extraordinary growth in demand in the past 
five years. 
Anytime you look at the two leading sectors in a category,  there will 
be some special explanations. A look at the weakest category in business 
producers' durable investment could tell a different story. For example, 
investment  in oil and gas  drilling equipment  has fallen  sharply  since 
1979-80 for well-known reasons. In 1983, investment in mining industries 
was  down  by  about  24 percent  while  the  economy  was  recovering. 
Emphasizing the sharp fall in mining investment  would leave one more 
impressed  with the  strength of business  investment  other than office 
equipment  and autos.  Even  so,  the tax cut hypothesis  would  fare no 
better, for the taxation  of mining equipment was  reduced in 1981 and 
1982. 
Bosworth  emphasizes  that the rental price of capital depends on the 
acquisition cost of the capital and the financial cost of funds, as well as 
on taxes.  In fact, he makes a good case that the nontax factors may have 
changed more in recent years than have tax considerations.  In general, 
the relative  cost  of capital goods  has declined.  The two categories  of 
investment  that grew  the  most,  office  equipment  and autos,  had the 
largest acquisition price declines,  resulting in a relatively large fall in the 
rental cost of capital for these items. What has happened to the financial 
cost of funds is harder to gauge. This cost,  which is the internal rate of 
return that equates the after-corporate-tax earnings of stockholders and 
bondholders  with the value  of the firm, is not directly  observable.  It 
depends  on  the  future  course  of  corporate  earnings,  which  must  be 
forecast  in order to generate a measure of the cost  of funds.  Bosworth 
effectively  emphasizes  the inherent difficulty and arbitrariness of such 
measures by reviewing four studies that attempt to measure the cost of 
funds,  each getting significantly different results.  I, of course,  have a Barr  y P. Bosuvorth  41 
personal interest in one of those measures,  the Brainard-Shoven-Weiss 
figures, and want to register an objection to his statement that our results 
precluded the possibility  of a major decline in the real rate of return to 
capital.'  In fact,  we  calculated  the  cost  of  funds  using  ten  different 
models  of earnings forecasting  (including perfect foresight)  and found 
our conclusion  of a sharply rising cost  of funds quite robust to model 
choice. 
The  last  part of  Bosworth's  paper  introduces  a promising  line  of 
research.  Recent  studies  have  shown  that  debt-financed  investment 
faces a much lower, and usually negative, rate of taxation when both the 
personal and corporate tax are considered.  Bosworth raises the question 
whether  the  fact  that he  could  establish  no  correlation  between  the 
corporate tax rate by asset category and investment may reflect the fact 
that some  assets  are more easily  financed with debt than others.  It is 
plausible  that business  automobiles,  for  instance,  can  be  nearly  100 
percent debt financed by firms. After all, they are regularly financed with 
very  high leverage  ratios by  households.  Office equipment  may  also 
have a reasonable used market and, therefore, may offer good collateral 
for debt financing. I think this line of reasoning is interesting and sound, 
and it may lead to lower estimates of the effective  rate of taxation facing 
auto and office  equipment  investments.  However,  I doubt that it will 
salvage the line of argument that the investment  boom is driven by tax 
cuts. The problem is that the debt carrying capacity argument, if valid, 
was also valid before the tax changes.  It does  not automatically follow 
that the  1981 and 1982 tax cuts actually reduced taxes  for these  items 
more than the earlier analysis  suggested,  only that the rate may have 
been lower, both before and after the changes in the tax law. Still, this 
section of Bosworth's  paper offers a new insight into the calculation of 
taxation across asset types,  and it is sure to spur further research. 
The strength of the recovery in terms of investment is welcome  news 
for the economy.  Bosworth's  paper suggests that it may have been only 
a lucky coincidence  for those who advocated  stimulating investment by 
means of tax breaks. Investment has boomed all right, only not so much 
in the areas where the stimulation was applied. 
1.  William  C.  Brainard,  John  B.  Shoven,  and  Laurence  Weiss,  "The  Financial 
Valuation of the Return to Capital," BPEA, 2:1980, pp. 453-502. 42  Berookings  Paper-s oti Economnic  Activity, 1:1985 
Lawrence H. Summers:  Barry Bosworth's  valuable paper assesses  the 
current investment  boom in the United States.  Bosworth's  focus  is on 
the composition  of investment and on the role of tax policy in explaining 
the recent behavior of investment.  His conclusions  are rather surprising. 
He confirms the widespread belief that investment  has been unusually 
strong over the past several years, but rejects the obvious  suspect-the 
1981 Economic  Recovery Tax Act reforms. His finding, if accepted,  has 
important implications for the current tax reform debate, since increased 
capital formation is a crucial goal of competing policy alternatives. 
Bosworth begins by documenting the abnormal strength of investment 
during the  recent  recovery.  The  strength of  investment  is  especially 
surprising, given the size of federal budget deficits,  the extraordinarily 
high level  of real interest rates, and the drastic reduction in American 
competitiveness  caused  by the strength of the dollar. Bosworth  notes 
that the lion's share of the growth in business  investment  has occurred 
in office equipment and automobiles.  His emphasis on these categories 
of investment  should not blind us to the resilience of other categories in 
the face of what we would have expected  to be very adverse conditions. 
Anyone  asked  to  predict  the  effect  on  investment  of  budget  deficits 
exceeding  5 percent of GNP and real interest rates in the 5 percent range 
would  surely  have  predicted  a dramatic  slowdown  in most  types  of 
capital spending. 
Much of the paper's analysis  is concerned  with isolating the role of 
changes in the cost of capital in explaining the behavior of investment. 
Bosworth properly stresses  that the cost of capital depends critically on 
the cost of funds and the acquisition price of new capital goods as well 
as  on  tax  policy  variables.  He  examines  a number of  cost-of-capital 
measures  proposed  by  various  economists  and notes  that they  varv 
widely.  And he stresses  that changes in the cost of funds seem to have 
had a much larger effect on the cost of capital than have variations in tax 
policy. 
Bosworth's  analysis  is  misleading  in  an  important  respect.  TIhe 
measures  of the cost  of capital that he surveys  all rely heavily  on the 
stock market as a measure of the cost of equity funds. Increases  in the 
stock  market reduce  the  measured  cost  of funds,  regardless  of  their 
source.  It seems  plausible to expect  that tax reductions  such as those 
enacted  in 1981, which would increase  corporate cash flow by greater 
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ratios. Bosworth  ascribes  this effect  to the cost  of funds and gives  no 
credit to tax policy.  Nor does he treat the increase in the present value 
of depreciation allowances  attributable to interest rate reductions over 
the past several years as part of the "tax policy component"  of the cost 
of capital. 
Aggregate information therefore  does  not cast  much doubt on the 
hypothesis  that the  1981 tax reforms served their intended purpose of 
substantially stimulating business  investment.  The centerpiece  of Bos- 
worth's  paper  is  a  cross-sectional  analysis  of  this  proposition.  He 
attempts  to  correlate  the  "noncyclical"  component  of  investment  in 
different asset categories with the corresponding change in the effective 
tax  rate.  He  finds essentially  no  correlation,  in  large part,  perhaps, 
because the effective  tax rate on office equipment and automobiles,  two 
assets  in which investment  rose sharply, was not much affected by the 
1981 act.  He  does,  however,  find  some  correlation  of  changes  in 
investment with movements  in the cost of capital for different types of 
investment.  Because  this  correlation  reflects  the  behavior  of  price 
indexes for new capital goods,  including computers that are normalized 
to have a constant nominal price, it is not clear what to make of it. 
I wonder if the finding that effective tax rates and investment perform- 
ance  are  uncorrelated  across  asset  types  does  not  say  more  about 
economists'  measures  of  effective  tax  rates  than  it  does  about  the 
investment process.  Since  capital goods  are, in general,  substitutes  or 
complements,  the effective  taxation of one type of capital good depends 
on the taxation of other types  of capital goods.  Standard effective  tax 
rate measures take no account of the risk associated  with different types 
of capital goods.  As Jeremy Bulow and I demonstrated, this can make a 
substantial difference in calculations of interasset neutrality.  ' The stand- 
ard calculations  on which  Bosworth  relies  also  neglect  the possibility 
that  assets  may  be  depreciated  more  than  once  if  they  are  resold. 
Bosworth emphasizes what is probably the most important problem with 
standard measures-their  failure  to  reflect  the  differential  ability  of 
assets  to carry debt.  Given all these  difficulties,  Bosworth's  failure to 
find a cross-sectional  relationship between investment and effective  tax 
rates cannot be taken as evidence  minimizing the role of tax policy  in 
determining investment decisions. 
1. Jeremy I. Bulow  and Lawrence  H.  Summers,  "The Taxation of Risky Assets," 
Journal of Political Economy,  vol. 92 (February 1984), pp. 20-39. 44  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1985 
In  concluding  his  paper,  Bosworth  urges  that  tax  reform  efforts 
concentrate on improving the long-term efficiency  of the tax system by 
increasing neutrality,  rather than on providing  short-term stimulus to 
investment.  This was not the direction taken in 1981. It is the direction 
taken in the  current administration tax  proposal  and in the  Bradley- 
Gephardt tax reform bill. 
The evidence in Bosworth' s paper seems to me to support the opposite 
conclusion.  Achieving  neutrality  requires  an  ability  to  measure  tax 
burdens on different types  of capital assets.  Bosworth  shows  that the 
best measures available to economists  and policymakers at present have 
essentially  nothing to do with actual investment.  Striving for neutrality 
based on these  measures  does  not seem an important priority. On the 
other hand, the dramatic increases  in cash  flow and the strong stock 
market  that  followed  the  1981 reforms  have  coincided  with  strong 
investment performance in an environment hostile to investment in many 
respects.  We  do  understand  how  to  use  tax  policy  successfully  to 
stimulate overall investment. It would be well to stick with this objective. 
General Discussion 
From Barry Bosworth's  findings,  Harvey  Galper concluded  that it 
was important to seek debt neutrality as well as depreciation neutrality 
in  the  tax  system.  He  noted  that  several  provisions  of  the  original 
Treasury tax reform proposals offered in November  1984 attempted to 
deal with the distortions arising from the present tax treatment of interest: 
indexing of interest costs;  limiting the use of interest expense  to offset 
some individual income; extending this limitation to passive partnerships 
by passing their interest expenses  through to individuals; and applying 
"at risk" rules to real estate similar to those that now apply to equipment. 
Joseph Pechman agreed with Galper and pointed out that the investment 
distortions  appear to be very large: between  1980 and 1984, industrial 
construction  was virtually unchanged,  while commercial construction, 
which is a favored tax shelter in the present system,  rose by nearly 70 
percent.  Robert Hall reasoned  that the distortions from debt financing 
arose largely because  interest is taxed when received  rather than when 
paid. Because  the U.S.  tax system makes it easy to avoid paying tax on 
interest  received,  borrowing is effectively  subsidized.  Hall suggested 
taxing all interest income when paid as a way to remove that distortion. Batrry  P. Bosworth  45 
Christopher Sims questioned  whether borrowing could be identified 
with particular  assets. Although there are instances in which a firm  exists 
to invest in a particular class of asset, usually as part of a tax shelter that 
depends on reselling for capital gains,  in the more typical case,  a firm 
invests in a whole array of assets associated  with its business.  In such a 
case, the firm's ability to borrow depends on its overall creditworthiness 
and is  not  closely  associated  with  any  particular asset  it is  buying. 
Bosworth reasoned that the existence  of a good resale market for some 
types of assets  makes them separable because  they can be pledged as 
collateral in order to obtain better borrowing terms. He agreed that for 
assets  with poor resale markets, the firm rather than the asset  may be 
the relevant unit for assessing  borrowing risk. Martin Feldstein  added 
that investment decisions  such as the building of a plant involve  equip- 
ment as well.  The rate of return on that bundle of plant and equipment 
determines  investment,  so  that  the  investment  decision  cannot  be 
disaggregated by individual assets.  This would help explain why indus- 
trial structures,  which  are filled with  equipment  when  built,  did not 
experience  the same post-tax-cut  boom as did commercial  structures, 
even though the rental price of both declined by the same amount. 
Benjamin Friedman related  Bosworth's  difficulty  in explaining  in- 
vestment  with rate-of-return variables to the ongoing debate over how 
to  model  cyclical  variations  in investment.  He  noted  that  both  real 
accelerator  variables  and financial quantities  such as profits and cash 
flow typically dominate rate-of-return variables in explaining business 
investment. 